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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-1262
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAWN COLEMAN,
Appellant
_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 1-10-cr-00484-001
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 20, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, Circuit Judges
and O’CONNOR,Associate Justice (Ret.)
(Filed: November 20, 2013)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Shawn Coleman, was found guilty by a jury of being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. Coleman appeals his conviction and argues that the District Court
erred by: (1) denying his suppression motion; (2) failing to order a new trial to
remedy a Brady violation;1 and (3) using a jury instruction to cure an instance of
prosecutorial vouching instead of declaring a mistrial. For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm.
I.
At about 2:00 AM on November 5, 2009, the Lindenwold, New Jersey
Police Department received a telephone call from a resident of an apartment
complex complaining that an unknown vehicle’s bright lights were shining into the
resident’s apartment unit. Officers Arthur Hall and George Przybylski responded
to the call and found the vehicle running with its high beams on and the radio
playing loudly. The officers observed Coleman in the front seat of the vehicle
either asleep or unconscious.

The officers’ attempts to rouse Coleman were

unsuccessful. Because they were concerned about Coleman’s unresponsiveness,
they checked and discovered the doors were unlocked. Officer Przybylski opened
the driver’s door and shook Coleman to no avail. Officer Hall, standing on the


The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
1
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
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passenger side of the car, reached over to turn off the car’s engine and to check
Coleman’s pulse. While reaching across the car, Hall observed a firearm sticking
out of the car’s center console. Officer Przybylski took Coleman from the vehicle
and Officer Hall secured the firearm.

Coleman regained consciousness, after

which Officer Przybylski placed him in handcuffs. Officer Hall asked him why he
was carrying the gun and whether he was an off-duty officer or someone else
permitted to carry a gun. Coleman responded that the gun was for his protection.
The officers placed Coleman in Przybylski’s patrol car. Przybylski advised
Coleman that he was being detained for the firearm but did not administer Miranda
warnings at the time.2 While driving to the police station, Przybylski was listening
to the radio. After a report that the New York Yankees had lost a World Series
Game to the Philadelphia Phillies, Coleman stated words to the effect that he was
“having a bad night, his Yankees lost and he shouldn’t have left the gun in the
open like that.” A87.
At the police station, Officer Przybylski advised Coleman of his Miranda
rights and Coleman executed the Miranda Warnings form. Coleman indicated that
he understood his rights and invoked his right to remain silent. While being
fingerprinted a few minutes later, Coleman spontaneously stated: “I can’t believe I
left the gun there. I’m not having a good night. The Yankees lost and now this.”
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-72 (1966).
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A132. Przybylski reminded Coleman that he had previously exercised his right to
remain silent and asked whether he wanted to speak with the officers. Coleman
declined and said nothing more.
After Coleman was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, he
moved to suppress his statements and the firearm. The Government opposed the
motion but noted that it would not offer Coleman’s statement at the scene, which
was uttered while Coleman was handcuffed and before he was administered the
Miranda warnings.
After a hearing and supplemental briefing by Coleman and the Government,
the District Court granted in part and denied in part Coleman’s suppression motion.
The District Court ruled: (1) that the officers’ warrantless entry into Coleman’s car
fell within the public safety exception to the Fourth Amendment; (2) that the
firearm found at the scene was legally seized under the plain view exception to the
Fourth Amendment; (3) that Coleman’s first statement did not satisfy the public
safety exception to Miranda and was inadmissible; and (4) that the Miranda
violation did not taint Coleman’s subsequent two statements because those
statements were uttered voluntarily and spontaneously.
A jury found Coleman guilty as charged.
II.
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“We review the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress for clear
error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to its legality in
light of the court’s properly found facts.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993,
999 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We apply this
same standard of review to Coleman’s Brady claim, which “presents questions of
law as well as questions of fact[.]” United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969
(3d Cir. 1991). Because Coleman objected to the line of questioning that he
contends impermissibly vouched for Officer Przybylski’s credibility, we review for
an abuse of discretion and harmless error. United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314,
325 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
Coleman argues that the District Court should have suppressed his second
and third statements, in which he admitted he had left the gun in the open. It is
unnecessary for us to address whether the District Court erred in admitting these
statements because the “admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence does
not warrant reversing a conviction where ‘the prosecution can show that the
evidence is so overwhelming that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict
would have been the same without the improper evidence.’” United States v.
5

Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Price, 13 F.3d
711, 720 (3d Cir.1994)). Here, the second and third statements pertain solely to
the element of whether Coleman knowingly possessed the firearm. See United
States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000) (establishing that elements of a
§ 922(g)(1) offense). It is undisputed that the firearm was discovered in plain view
beside Coleman in the center console of the car in which he was the sole occupant.
This was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of possession.
Coleman also contends that the prosecution violated its obligations under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), by failing to turn over statements
that he could have used to impeach Officer Przyblyski at the suppression hearing.
This claim lacks merit because the information, which was produced by the
government immediately after receiving it days before trial, would not have
impeached Officer Przybylski’s credibility because it did not relate to his character
for truthfulness.
Finally, Coleman asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial because the
prosecution vouched for the credibility of Officer Przybylski during its direct
examination of him. Coleman objected to the question and answer he cites as
impermissible vouching. After hearing the parties at sidebar, the District Court
struck the question and answer, and instructed the jury not only to disregard the
question and answer but also to remember that they are to determine the credibility
6

of the witnesses. Because the testimony was stricken and because the Court
provided an appropriate instruction to the jury, there is no basis for granting relief
for impermissible vouching. See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 195 (3d Cir.
2010) (concluding relief unwarranted for vouching because, inter alia, defendant’s
objection was sustained).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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